During the ceremony marking his induction into the Basketball Hall of Fame, Michael Jordan concluded his speech with these words:
“One day, you might look up and see me playing at 50.”

The audience laughed.

MJ, who had anticipated this reaction (because he had anticipated it—there’s no doubt about that; you don’t become MJ by chance), ended with a final statement that encapsulates his mindset and essence:
“Never say never, because limits, like fears, are often just an illusion.”

For MJ, these inspirational words are not just a slogan.

They represent the essence of an extraordinary, iconic career built on dedication, courage, and sacrifice. They embody a competitive mindset bordering on obsession, one that worked on overcoming its own limits and evolved through meditation to become a winning philosophy—globally dominant. Triumphing over everyone and despite everything.

MJ’s words serve as an opportunity to reflect on the efforts of non-profit organizations in achieving their goals. The comparison might seem far-fetched or inappropriate, but there is no doubt that the non-profit world is one of the most complex landscapes to navigate.

Legal, bureaucratic, economic, and cultural limitations often become insurmountable walls, turning every project into a Herculean task not everyone can undertake. These are real limits, unfortunately—not illusory ones—that foster a culture of timidity, shortsightedness, and dependency. Among these challenges are systemic shortages of funding and skilled professionals—not to mention the traps of public grants and funding processes.

And yet, there is a “however” that grows in significance and has the power to change what might seem like a predictable outcome. It can reverse the narrative.

The non-profit world has a powerful, rebellious, courageous, revolutionary, and unconventional spirit. It is embodied by the people who work in this extraordinary sector, often personally connected to the needs they seek to address, usually working alone and underappreciated. Yet they remain active and enthusiastic, despite everything.

This leads us back to MJ’s words: a paradoxical situation where individuals or organizations with extraordinary potential, willing to do anything to help others, are stifled by a system of limits and obstacles so tangible and real that they prevent growth.

In a reverse logic to that described by MJ, there is a desire to achieve great things and surpass one’s limits, but progress stalls when stepping out of one’s own reality into the external world. In other words, while the right mindset is there, the system often lacks the means to embrace and implement it.

Let’s think about resources—a critical issue.

Many organizations (particularly in the Italian context) struggle to make ends meet. They turn to public institutions, but the procedures to access funding would discourage even the most dedicated philanthropist. And when resources finally arrive—if they arrive—they are insufficient to cover the full lifecycle of a project. These funds are insensitive to the possibility of failure, which is often an essential part of the process, sometimes necessary to refine the model and ultimately achieve success.

Equally delicate is the issue of training. There is no adequate professionalization of the roles within the non-profit sector. Managers, notaries, lawyers, accountants, and tax experts with specific training to address the technical complexities of this sector are sorely lacking.

And then, let’s admit it: the non-profit world lacks a genuine entrepreneurial culture. There is a widespread and mistaken belief that non-profit is synonymous with volunteering, whereas it actually means non-distribution of profits, which can and should still be generated. What is truly devastating, however, is the absence of a culture of entrepreneurship for social purposes. As long as this gap persists, the entire non-profit system will remain marginalized, viewed with unnecessary goodwill and unspoken pity.

We must ask ourselves what can be done to overcome this situation. Appropriate and innovative answers could come from foundations and for-profit companies. Foundations, in particular, must not only act as funding bodies but also experiment with new intervention methods.

In every non-profit organization, there is undoubtedly someone with MJ’s mindset. Every non-profit organization has the potential to become an unbeatable team, like the Chicago Bulls of the ’90s. The challenge is to create the conditions for them to act. The true challenge of the future, alongside the fight against climate change, is precisely this.

If artificial intelligence (AI) is destined to change and improve our future, it is essential to question its potential applications in philanthropy and the non-profit sector.

Setting aside ethical and regulatory aspects, which remain critical, let us consider whether and how AI can serve philanthropic efforts, enhancing their effectiveness and impact.

AI might bring intriguing advancements to philanthropy, such as enabling philanthropists to quickly gather detailed information on non-profit organizations, more easily identify donors, and facilitate job matching for vulnerable populations. It could also accelerate data collection for systemic philanthropy, aimed at solving problems sustainably rather than supporting isolated projects. Moreover, AI could simplify impact measurement for philanthropic initiatives, preventing unnecessary investments. Additionally, AI’s support in therapies might reduce complexity, making treatments more manageable and effective.

The topic of AI in philanthropy requires reflection on two levels: economic and systemic/organizational.

Economic Considerations
Currently, major investments in AI are focused primarily on industrial sectors like aerospace and automotive. Conversely, funding for the non-profit sector remains limited. The lack of resources for technological innovation in such a vital area could significantly undermine its ability to address people’s needs effectively, resulting in a loss of impact and competitiveness. This could harm the common good, which non-profits strive to safeguard through dedication and sacrifice.

Organizational Challenges
Even if the sector secures AI investments, there is a risk that these resources may not be efficiently managed due to cumbersome bureaucracy or insufficient staff training. This could lead to the underutilization of allocated funds, a scenario reminiscent of some European grants that remain untapped due to restrictive national legislation and impractical practices.

Conclusion
AI presents new challenges that, if approached with respect for rights and a human-centered perspective, could drive substantial innovation in addressing social goals. However, success requires planning, training, rethinking resource management methods, and enhancing research structures.

A recent milestone highlights this potential: the European AI and Society Fund received a $1 million grant from the Luminate Group to ensure AI development in Europe prioritizes the public good, human rights, and social justice. This collaborative effort by 14 foundations will enable civil society groups across Europe to influence AI policies and discussions. The funding aims to strengthen these organizations, enhance their capacities, and amplify the voices of vulnerable communities facing risks like algorithmic discrimination and economic exclusion.

A better future is possible. Rather than opposing technological evolution, we must create conditions to embrace and leverage its vast potential.

The internal road of the settlement of Ma’aleh Shomron leads to a virgin trail in a nature reserve, that leads to the farm Havat Dorot Illit Upper Dorot.

Atop the hill is the home of the farm’s owners: Ben Yishai Eshed, along with his wife Leah and their two small children. One family and a herd of cattle that lives close to the area where a veteran Palestinian communities resides. At some distance from the family’s there is makeshift headquarters of the soldiers from the Israel Defense Forces regional defense unit who are guarding the settler outpost.

Dorot Illit constitutes part of an experimental educational, non-profit project, for young people who struggle to integrate into formal settings, which involves the establishment of agricultural farms that serve as a kind of boarding school for the youth, where they are taught to love and work “their land.” . In 2023, the nonprofit that operates the farm received almost 400,000 shekels (about $110,000) from the Negev and Galilee Development Ministry. Until the end of 2023, the farm was also supported as part of a program for at-risk youth initiated by the Jewish National Fund.

This past month, settlers from different farms and its environs arrived at a nearby Palestinian village, attacked them with iron pipes, clubs and stones and many village residents were hospitalized. Complaints filed by the villagers were dismissed by the police, who claimed it was unable to locate the suspects.

Palestinians says that abusive acts were perpetrated by the people from the farm and the live in a climate of fear since the establishment of these outposts.

Palestinian activist Alice Kisiya, right, whose family land was taken over by armed Israeli settlers, confronts a settler in the area of al-Makhrour in the occupied West Bank, near Beit Jala, on August 22, 2024.

The Havat Dorot Illit is one of the most extreme and unruly places in the West Bank, which has became a focal point of friction and violence almost from its very inception enjoys a hefty slice of public funding. And it’s not the only one.

By early 2017, there were 23 such outposts scattered across the West Bank. But since then there has been a strong surge in their number, with some 65 new ones established within just seven years.

Tens of millions of dollars in public funds are being injected into these communities directly by government ministries, the local authorities in the territories and the World Zionist Organization’s Settlement Division. Concurrently, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has announced that he is working to have the farms formally legalized.

The outpost farmers are now working shoulder to shoulder with the state, which is granting loans for establishing their communities, allocating contracts for pasture land, hooking them up to infrastructure, underwriting their security needs, purchasing equipment for them and also offering pasturing grants and even business entrepreneurship grants, whose underlying purpose is the forceful takeover of land and systematic dispossession of Palestinian residents.

Unfortunately in many cases the farming and shepherding outposts have become a breeding ground for extreme act of violence to the Palestinian.

The vanguard force is often comprised of at-risk teenagers themselves who led assaults and harassment that forced Palestinian residents of another village to flee.

The international arena has not been indifferent to these developments. In the past year, the United States, Britain and other countries have imposed sanctions on the owners of different farms, but the young volunteers living in these communities are not affected by the international condemnation.

From the observation point at the top of the hill, no binoculars are necessary for viewing new developments in the area. At the foot of Nili lies Magnezi Farm, named for its founder, Yosef Chaim Magnezi, who lives there with his wife Devora and their toddler son. Magnezi covers about 5,000 dunams (1,250 acres – 506 Hectars ) of farmland, basically the size of the city in central Israel.

Photo: Magnezi Farm – source David Bachar

Magnezi Farm has extended long tentacles into Palestinian-owned land around it by means of new dirt paths. Magnezi, for his part, stated in an interview, “There are going to be Jews in these hills.

Magnezi told the Channel 7 News: “The young people, to their credit, have this fire in their eyes. They’re the ones who need to do these crazy things… ” Magnezi himself had been investigated on suspicion of making threats and of trespassing in an incident that took place in a nearby Palestinian village. The farm was a focal point of “disturbances and friction.” but Magnezi Farm, receives generous government funding yearly. Also the Agriculture Ministry has provided a modest grant to the farm and another support for its operations comes from the Jewish funders network,JNF .

The JNF during the past three years has transferred 5.5 million shekels ( around 1.5 million of Euros) to its farm youth program, which helps volunteers on agricultural and shepherding outposts and is defined as” a program for assisting at-risk youth”.

In the view of left-wing activists, projects promoted “as serving at-risk youth” have always been an effective means for taking over land in the West Bank. Some farm are built without a permit, But then they are legalized and also receive support from the Israeli armed forces.

The outposts in question are spending the 54 million shekels (13 million of Euros) over two years, to acquire utility task vehicles, drones, cameras, generators, electric gates, illumination poles, fences, solar panels and more. However, Peace Now ( a non-governmental organization, liberal with the aim of promoting a two-state solution) reports that devices used for security purposes have recently been installed in at least 30 farms, including five on which international sanctions have been imposed for violent acts against Palestinians.

Besides seizing land, the farmers often act as “self-appointed inspectors” who deal to check the illegal Palestinian construction, by means of drones, threats and reports to the authorities. They have been joined by so-called land patrol departments set up by various councils, to which the Settlements Ministry has allocated tens of millions of shekels since 2021. Over the past two years, the patrol bodies have received an average of 35 million shekels per year ((8.5 million of Euros), in order to prevent planning and construction violations and the seizure of state lands. Even though it is the Civil Administration that should have the authority to supervise Palestinian construction. This funding has been used to acquire all-terrain vehicles and to install cameras in open areas, for partial funding of salaries and for building roads and closing off areas.

The farms are examples of outposts that are presented to the public as places of leisure and recreational activities, but whose real raison d’être is “hidden”.

Some farm is also known as a “country hospitality compound. However, in a tour to a farm which was documented by the BBC last month, the ultimate purpose for which the place was established open areas [ areas of 7 sq. km, a size of a small city] which no can enters and no one can even approaches …

Most of these teenagers there are “people who dropped out of school because of learning disabilities or incompatibility with the system, sometimes due to religious incompatibility or because of ADHD (Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) Are boys who got into trouble with the law and supposed to be sent to a rehabilitative framework, but sometime are able to persuade the judge to allow him to reside on a farm instead.

In the past the farmers themselves would go to confront the Palestinians and the activists. Now these youngsters are on the front line.

This is not what a rehabilitation process of at-risk youth should look like. Places like those are fertile ground for the development of hate. And hate is not rehabilitation.

Rabbi Arik Ascherman, who is the founder of the human rights organization Torah of Justice and who has been attacked a number of times during his years of activism, says: “The farm owners perceive themselves as educators, Something I obviously contest. Beyond the wicked things these youths do to Palestinians, we also need to consider what the stay on the farms does to them.”

The JNF stated this program accords youth an opportunity to integrate into various frameworks in Israeli society, as active, contributing citizens: “This is a valuable educational program that educates youth to love the country, through which youths are enveloped by a learning environment that includes, among other elements, Zionist education aimed at getting to know the land, vocational training in various fields, basic life skills and proficiency, and more”.

It’s that ” and more” that worries us…

Go watch the film I Shall Not Hate by the talented Franco-American documentarian Tal Barda, and if you can, also read the book of the same name.

Izzeldin Abuelaish has endured the unimaginable. He has sought justice, but until now, in vain.

From his story of blood and pain emerges a personal crusade for reconciliation and the coexistence of two peoples, today more distant than ever.

Israel and Palestine. Two worlds, two different cultures, separated by the poison of hatred, which blinds and sows death in a schizophrenic and insane crescendo that erases every rule of national and international law.

And yet for years, in the name of these two peoples, Izzeldin Abuelaish has been fighting a deeply personal, but universal, war that overshadows and undermines the tragic war currently raging, demonstrating its illogicality and total uselessness.

It is a struggle profoundly different from the one fought with bombings and drones. It has different rules of engagement, different communication codes. It has an equally devastating impact but causes no death.

Izzeldin Abuelaish’s war is a war for peace. The word “war,” in reference to Dr. Abuelaish’s story and his global campaign against all forms of hatred and discrimination, is emptied of its sinister semantic weight and evokes the power of a benevolent force that spreads to deliver a message of love.

War can be a tool for achieving peace. But if the goal is Peace, and it is pursued through war, in between there are deaths, destruction, domination, desolation, and suffering.

Izzeldin Abuelaish fights for the salvation of his people, but he possesses no weapons that cause harm. His voice is the only weapon he has, and it becomes the tool to keep memory alive, to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes. It spreads like a virus, generating an indelible feeling of hope.

Izzeldin Abuelaish is a Palestinian doctor who, for years (he was the first Palestinian to do so), worked in an Israeli hospital. On one cursed night in 2009, an Israeli tank, positioned menacingly beneath his home in Gaza, bombed his daughters’ bedroom, killing three of them.

It was an enormous tragedy, reported live by Abuelaish himself during an Israeli news program, becoming one of the most dramatic iconic moments of the Israeli-Palestinian war.

Despite the overwhelming grief, Dr. Abuelaish immediately began to speak of peace and coexistence—defying every logic and expectation that would have seen him blinded by hatred and seeking revenge.

He sued the Israeli state only to obtain an apology (simply but symbolically, “Sorry”), but the outcome of his legal action is easy to predict. Yet he does not give up, he does not allow hatred to poison his thoughts, and he becomes an activist for peace and coexistence between the two peoples. He begins to make his voice heard and to spread his message of hope.

In memory of his daughters—Bessan, then 21, Mayar, 15, and Aya, 13—and his niece Noor, 17, Dr. Abuelaish founded the Daughters for Life Foundation, a charity that supports young women of Middle Eastern nationalities, regardless of their origin or religious affiliation, to access higher education.

Since that fateful 2009, the echo of his cry for peace has not faded; it is as strong and relevant as ever.

Speaking today about the coexistence of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples is a revolutionary act. It may be dismissed as a sterile exercise in romanticism, detached from an objective and realistic view of the endless conflict that has torn apart these two historic enemies for decades.

The term evokes a utopian scenario in which, finally, the two peoples recognize each other’s existence and dignity and live peacefully in mutual respect.

Coexistence is the presence of two distinct entities that do not renounce their identity but act to make their diversity an opportunity for harmony and cultural growth through the acceptance of the other and mutual enrichment.

Coexistence does not mean inclusion. It has a deeper value because it does not imply the existence of a subject that includes and decides how and when to include, according to a discriminatory logic that perpetuates ancient dynamics of domination and oppression.

What an extraordinary word, coexistence. It is universal, transversal, flexible, applicable to any context in which diversity and individual differences exist.

It is a way of seeing the world, resistant to the logic of domination, hatred, and revenge, which unexpectedly, in this tragic story, belongs to someone who, considering the wrongs he has suffered, should have very different terms in his vocabulary.

Such a strong and powerful message should receive legal recognition by a court, but law, as we know, is often subservient to reasons of state. This is a sad awareness, but it should not lead to surrender.

This is the story of Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish as told in the film I Shall Not Hate. The documentary opens the doors of Gaza for us and lets us breathe in the smell of death. But despite everything, thanks to the tenacity of its extraordinary protagonist, it manages to instill hope for a different future.

This film should be shown in schools, universities, and public squares. It should be made accessible and understandable to everyone.

Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish’s voice must become our voice. The voice of everyone. It’s never too late.

In 2022, the Government of Costa Rica declared a national emergency after a ransomware attack brought 27 government bodies offline, disrupting everyday functions for months. In 2023, an employee of a multinational corporation in Hong Kong transferred $25.6 million after being instructed to do so during a Zoom call with colleagues he recognized. The other attendees, however, were deepfakes, and the money was sent to sham accounts.    

The frequency, sophistication, and costliness of cybercrimes have continued to increase in recent years, and they are becoming notoriously difficult to counter. International consensus and cooperation are becoming more critical to address the rapidly evolving risks these crimes pose to States, businesses, and individuals.  

In 2021, the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes held its first organizational session, with the ultimate goal of drafting a convention to address cybercrime (“the Convention”). However, defining the precise purpose and scope of such a convention is fraught with complexities; balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of privacy and human rights remains a significant challenge.    

After three years of negotiation, this group will hold its reconvened concluding session from 29 July to 9 August 2024. During this session, it is expected to reach an agreement on the final text of the Convention; the most recent draft was released on 23 May 2024. The text of the Convention may change significantly during the upcoming negotiations. This primer addresses some key aspects and debates related to the current text. They can be summarized as follows:  

• The Convention criminalizes a range of core cyber-dependent crimes, and a limited number of cyber-enabled crimes. It also obligates States to develop digital investigation and enforcement capabilities, and to apply these new powers to other crimes conducted using computer networks;
• Cyber investigations can be invasive, and digital rights groups argue that the expanded scope and lack of sufficient safeguards endanger human rights;
• The Convention uses technologically neutral language; it addresses activities, not methods, so that it will remain relevant as technology changes; and
• The Convention focuses on combating negative uses of technology, not promoting positive uses.  

What is a “Cybercrime?”

There is no international consensus on what constitutes a cybercrime, and the current draft of the Convention does not provide an explicit definition. Cybercrime is used as an umbrella term for a range of online activity with two broad categories: cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes.

Much traditional criminal activity is conducted online but doesn’t require the use of a computer. These are called cyber-enabled crimes. Examples include drug and weapons trafficking, identity theft, fraud, and incitement of violence. Cyber-dependent crimes, on the other hand, are crimes that can be committed only through the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) devices. You can’t spread malware if there’s no computer or network to infect.  

Negotiations on Scope

Throughout its negotiations, parties have disagreed if this Convention should address crimes that can be committed only through the use of computers or networks, or also cover other crimes if committed through the use of an ICT. In the case of the former, the treaty would define and criminalize a range of cyber-dependent crimes and provide procedural measures through which States would cooperatively investigate and enforce those activities. Some States that align with this vision—including New Zealand, Canada, and the United States—have suggested that specified cyber-enabled crimes may also be within the scope of the treaty if they have exploded in scale through the use of ICTs, such as digital fraud and the dissemination of child sexual abuse material.  

On the other side of the debate, States including Russia and China expect the Convention to address a wide range of criminal activities conducted using ICTs (cyber-enabled) in addition to cyber-dependent crimes. India, China, and Indonesia were among States that proposed the Convention criminalize the dissemination of disinformation or “harmful information.” Russia’s 2021 submission enumerated 24 unlawful acts to be established under the Convention, including narcotics trafficking, coercion to suicide, and “extremism-related offences.”  

Human and digital rights organizations have opposed the latter vision, warning of the serious threats to human rights that a broad scope poses, especially without adequate safeguards and protections in place. A wide scope, either through defined cyber-enabled crimes or through vague language, risks criminalizing content and activities, including political dissent, independent journalism, and LGBTQ+ resources.

Investigating crimes committed via ICTs can be a highly invasive process and can be used to justify vast surveillance. Digital rights organizations and UN bodies, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have raised concern over how domestic cybercrime laws are often used to justify restricting freedoms of speech, assembly, and association.

There are legitimate reasons for capacity development and international cooperation in investigating crimes committed through ICTs. However, human rights advocates emphasize that a narrow scope, clear limitations, and explicit safeguards for human rights are necessary to prevent infringement of privacy, excessive information collection, criminalization of legitimate online speech, and the undermining of transparency and trust in digital communications.   

However, human rights advocates emphasize that a narrow scope, clear limitations and explicit safeguards for human rights are necessary to prevent infringement of privacy, excessive information collection, criminalization of legitimate online speech, and the undermining of transparency and trust in digital communications.

Scope of the Current Draft: Criminalization, Enforcement, and Cooperation  

Article 3 of the most recent draft defines the Convention’s scope in two parts. First, the text addresses “the prevention, investigation and prosecution” of activities criminalized in the Convention (Articles 7–17), which are:  

• Illegal access to an ICT system;
• Illegal interception of electronic data;
• Interference with electronic data or an ICT system;
• Misuse of devices for the above purposes;
• Forgery, theft, or fraud related to an ICT system;
• Solicitation, production, distribution, or possession of child sexual abuse material through ICTs;
• Dissemination of intimate images without consent of the subject through ICTs; and
• Laundering of proceeds of any of the above crimes.

Article 3(b) broadens the scope to include the collection and preservation of a range of electronic data related to “other criminal offenses”—including domestic crimes—committed through an ICT (Article 23), and wide international cooperation in collecting and sharing evidence (Article 35).  

This means that the robust investigative powers States are obligated to develop under the Convention may be exercised for almost any reason, so long as the targeted activity is illegal under a State’s domestic law. Procedural measures and enforcement to which this scope applies include empowering State authorities to order, collect, or obtain:  

• The preservation of traffic data, content data, and subscriber information;
• Specified electronic data stored within its territory;
• The assistance of service providers or other entities in control of the data in search and seizure;
• Collection of real-time traffic data; and
• Interception of content data.  

This means that the robust investigative powers States are obligated to develop under the Convention may be exercised for almost any reason, so long as the targeted activity is illegal under a State’s domestic law. 

Provisions in the procedural scope obligate States to compel service providers to keep their mandatory involvement with the preservation or collection of data confidential. In theory, this means that the Convention empowers and legitimizesStates to conduct vast levels of potentially invasive surveillance for any activity deemed illegal under their domestic law, including through forced assistance of service providers in procedures that evade transparency or oversight.  

The definition of “electronic data”—which is subject to preservation, production, and search and seizure—includes all data, whether or not it has been communicated. Documents and notes saved on personal devices are therefore subject to production and seizure from authorities.      

That this collection applies to domestic laws means that digital surveillance could be conducted to investigate activity protected throughout much of the world. For example, LGBTQ+ people could be targeted in the 64 UN Member States in which homosexuality is illegal (this number is based on 2023 data).  

It’s important to remember that States could conduct similar digital investigations in their territory without this Convention; the treaty requires States to pass legislation in their respective countries that could come into effect without international obligation. The Convention would, however, require the global development of these systems. Furthermore, the Convention would obligate international cooperation on a range of digital investigations and prosecutions.  

There are practical benefits to this. States have legitimate authority to collect evidence related to criminal investigations and prosecutions, but many lack the infrastructure and procedural systems to do so with digital data. This Convention would motivate them to develop infrastructure and procedures, and provisions in the text provide for technological assistance to be made available for developing States.  

Article 35 defines the scope of international cooperation on the “collection, obtaining, preserving and sharing of evidence in electronic form.” Related provisions in the current draft require “the widest measure of mutual legal assistance” for investigations and prosecutions of crimes established in the Convention, as well as for “serious crimes” committed using an ICT.

Requiring that these investigations be motivated by serious crimes (or an activity criminalized in the Convention) is also a limitation applied to the collection of content data. A serious crime is defined in the text as a crime for which the applicable domestic penalty carries a maximum sentence of four years imprisonment or more. Therefore, a State could reasonably increase the sentence for any crime it wants covered by the Convention, thereby making the offense “serious.”     

Safeguards and Limitations

Parallel with debates over scope, States have had wide disagreements over the extent to which the Convention should articulate safeguards for human rights. While the draft text contains human rights provisions, many organizations argue they are insufficient to meaningfully prevent human rights violations.  

Article 6 provides safeguards that apply to the entirety of the Convention, and Article 24 describes those that apply to domestic surveillance powers. Neither provision specifically references existing human rights treaties; they require States’ implementation of the treaty to be “consistent with their obligations” under international human rights law. Article 6 also includes an additional safeguard, adopted from a proposal from Canada, which asserts that States cannot interpret anything in the Convention as “permitting suppression of human rights or fundamental freedoms.”    

Article 24 upholds that the implementation of surveillance powers is subject to safeguards provided for under each State’s domestic law. Unfortunately, the limitations that are necessary to ensure human rights are absent in many domestic legal systems. The Article also maintains that these powers incorporate the principle of proportionality. It does not, however, require accordance with other key principles, including legality, non-discrimination, legitimate purpose, and necessity.

Artificial Intelligence in the Convention and Beyond

Throughout negotiations, parties have been in general agreement that the Convention should use technologically neutral language so that the activity remains illegal if and when methods or targets change. Methods and mechanisms used in cyberattacks evolve rapidly, and the release of ChatGPT and other generative artificial intelligence (AI) models has given new meaning and scope to cybercrimes.  

This technological neutrality means that criminalization is not evaded through the malicious use of AI. The use of deepfakes to deceive employees in Hong Kong, for example, is criminalized under Article 13, which addresses ICT-related theft and fraud. Article 11 obligates States to criminalize “a device, including a program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing” a cyber-dependent crime defined in Articles 7–10. This language appears to criminalize AI models fine-tuned to generate malware and other malicious code.

Similarly, Article 14 defines child sexual abuse material it criminalizes as sexualized content that “depicts, describes or represents” a minor. This includes the criminalization of AI-generated material; although the text permits States to require the subject to be a real child. Article 16, which criminalizes “non-consensual dissemination of intimate images,” on the other hand, addresses “visual recording[s] of a person,” not generated content.  

In thinking through these aspects, parties should investigate what problem the treaty is trying to address: Is it criminalizing malicious activities that didn’t exist before the advent of the internet, or promoting capacity-building and cooperation in digital enforcement of “traditional” crimes conducted online? If the latter, are those crimes defined by domestic or international law? In either case, it’s critical to consider how enforcement can be optimized to both efficiently prioritize resource distribution and safeguard a wide range of human rights.  

When considering dynamic technological landscapes, policymakers often respond by segmenting digital space as a separate policy area. But is it? ICTs are an integral means by which individuals and institutions conduct a range of malicious, beneficial, and benign activities. If these activities are the subject of governance, then is a blanket policy over the means by which the activity is conducted effective? Instead, perhaps States should consider whether existing issue-specific international instruments—such as those dedicated to drugs and crimes—can be made more effective by incorporating digital dynamics.

Learn more:  

• In January 2024, over 100 groups from around the world signed a Joint Statement on the Proposed Cybercrime Treaty Ahead of the Concluding Sessionand issued it to UN negotiators.  
• In July 2024, 22 civil society organizations signed an urgent appeal to EU delegates to address critical flaws in the Convention draft.
• During a recent media briefing, the Electronic Frontier Foundation shared an oral statement text and draft FAQ on the subject and Convention.

Read more: https://unu.edu/cpr/blog-post/understanding-uns-new-international-treaty-fight-cybercrime

During the ongoing war in Gaza, the Israeli government has granted 12 gas exploration licenses off the coast of Gaza to six companies, including British BP, Italian Eni, Dana Petroleum, and Israeli Ratio Petroleum. The Israeli Ministry of Energy announced these new natural gas concessions in areas that, according to international law, fall within Palestinian maritime boundaries.

The concession areas include Zone G, adjacent to the Gaza coast, of which 62% lies within Palestinian maritime boundaries, and Zones H and E, of which 73% and 5% respectively are located within the maritime boundaries claimed by Palestine.

The granting of these licenses demonstrates Israel’s disregard for international law, as it cannot legally issue licenses in areas where it has no sovereign rights. International law prohibits, for commercial purposes. the exploitation of natural resources in occupied territories.

Palestine declared its maritime boundaries when it joined the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2015, providing geographic coordinates and figures of the area in 2019.

However, Israel is not a party to UNCLOS and does not recognize the State of Palestine, which provides a pretext for not recognizing Palestinian maritime boundaries and ignoring international norms.

Israeli authorities exercise complete and effective control over Palestinian maritime areas, denying Gaza access to resources in its own waters, despite the Oslo Accords guaranteeing Palestinians the right to access an area 20 nautical miles from the Gaza coast.

It is importance to highlight that since 1947 Israel has not only occupied 85% of Palestine since 1947 but also 80% of the sea.

The new gas exploration licenses have been contested by several Palestinian human rights groups, who have sent letters to the Israeli Minister of Energy and the Attorney General requesting the cancellation of these tenders, deemed a violation of international law, in accordance with the rules of the article 55 of the Hague Regulations.For decades, Israel has adopted a unilateral approach to appropriating natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territories. The recent offshore concessions are seen as another attempt to illegally seize Palestinian resources.

Israel’s energy ambitions, highlighted by its intention to become an energy hub exporting gas to Europe, have been hampered by the ongoing war in Gaza. Energy analysts emphasize that the sovereignty situation of the Gaza Strip is ambiguous enough that international energy companies should be cautious about working with Israel near an active war zone.

Israel made a maritime jurisdiction delimitation agreement with the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus in 2010 and that the area that should fall to Palestine under international law was not included in this agreement. Palestine is defenseless and weak in preventing such activities in its declared jurisdiction areas, Contrary at the same time Türkiye, which has the military capability and power to prevent any unlawful drilling and licensing in the Eastern Mediterranean, within its maritime boundaries.

The gas exploration licenses off the coast of Gaza are part of a broader strategic plan by Israel to consolidate its role as an energy supplier, but they raise significant legal and sovereignty issues that further complicate the already delicate geopolitical dynamics of the region.

For nearly a decade, Israel has been surveilling senior International Criminal Court officials and Palestinian human rights workers as part of a secret operation to thwart the International Criminal Court’s  in investigate alleged war crimes.

The operation, which dates back to 2015, has seen the Israel’s intelligence routinely surveil the court’s current chief prosecutor Karim Khan, his predecessor Fatou Bensouda, and dozens of other ICC and UN officials.

Israeli intelligence also monitored materials that the Palestinian Authority submitted to the prosecutor’s office, and surveilled employees at four Palestinian human rights organizations whose submissions are central to the probe.

The Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, ran its own parallel operation which sought out compromising information on Bensouda and her close family members in an apparent attempt to sabotage the ICC’s investigation. The agency’s former head, Yossi Cohen, personally attempted to “enlist” Bensouda and manipulate her into complying with Israel’s wishes, according to sources familiar with his activities, causing the then-prosecutor to fear for her personal safety.

The investigation draws on interviews with more than two dozen current and former Israeli intelligence officers and government officials, ex-ICC officials, diplomats, and lawyers familiar with the ICC case and Israel’s efforts to undermine it. According to these sources, initially, the Israeli operation attempted to prevent the court from opening a full criminal investigation.

Israel has long held that the ICC has no jurisdiction to prosecute Israeli leaders because, like the United States, Russia, and China, Israel is NOT a signatory to the Rome Statute which established the court, and Palestine is NOT a full UN member state.

But Palestine was nevertheless recognized as an ICC member upon signing the convention in 2015, having been admitted to the UN General Assembly as a non-member observer state three years prior.

Immediately after becoming a member of the court, the Palestinian Authority asked the prosecutor’s office to investigate crimes committed in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, starting from the date on which the State of Palestine accepted the court’s jurisdiction: July 13, 2014.

Fearing the legal and political consequences of potential prosecutions, Israel raced to prepare intelligence teams in the army, the Shin Bet (domestic intelligence), and the Mossad (foreign intelligence), alongside a covert team of military and civilian lawyers, to lead the effort to forestall a full ICC investigation.

Four sources confirmed Bensouda’s private exchanges with Palestinian officials about the PA’s case were routinely monitored and shared widely within Israel’s intelligence community.

Dozens of other international officials related to the probe were similarly surveilled, around 60 people, including UN officials and ICC personnel.

In addition to monitoring materials that the PA submitted to the ICC,  Shin Bet, also monitored four Palestinian human rights organizations: Al-Haq, Addameer, Al Mezan, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR). Addameer, sent appeals to the ICC about torture practices against prisoners and detainees, while the other three groups sent multiple appeals over the years regarding Israel’s settlement enterprise in the West Bank, punitive house demolitions, bombing campaigns in Gaza. Another goal of surveilling the Palestinian groups was to try to delegitimize them.

In May 2021, according to an intelligence source, the Shin Bet surveilled the organizations’s employees, and the Israeli Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, declared them terrorist without showing any serious evidence.  Later on an investigation by Citizen Lab (a laboratory studies of information & controls, based in Canada) identified that through a software named “Pegasus Spyware” (produced by the Israeli firm NSO Group) they were spying on the phones of several Palestinians working in those NGOs.

Photo: logos of Palestinian human rights organizations

When Al-Haq collects information on how many Palestinians have been killed in the occupied territories in the past year and passes it on to Bensouda she announced in 2021 the opening of a formal criminal investigation.

In June 2021,  Karim Khan replaced Bensouda as chief prosecutor.

Photo: Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the ICC, International Criminal Court

Just as with his predecessor, Israeli intelligence also surveilled Khan’s activities with Palestinians and other officials in his office.

Eventually, on May 20, Khan announced that he was seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, after finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the two leaders bear responsibility for crimes including extermination, starvation, and deliberate attacks on civilians.

Mr. Khan announcement that his office “will not hesitate to act” against ongoing threats against the court and its investigation and those Israeli leaders can be prosecuted regardless of the fact that Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute.

The spokesperson added that Khan’s office has been subjected to “several forms of threats and communications that could be viewed as attempts to unduly influence its activities.”

The Israeli army also responded in brief: the intelligence operations are only against “hostile elements” and not against the ICC or other international elements.

The Netflix series “Baby Reindeer,” a true global phenomenon, has the rare power to touch on some common threads among all of us, stimulating reflection on the desperate need for attention and approval that nowadays, for some, is satisfied through the obsessive search for likes on posts published on various social networks.

In an era like ours, none of us is exempt from this reflection. We are so immersed in a culture based on appearance that we fail to notice the fragility of this form of self-representation, which rewards the display of the best side of ourselves, often non-existent or having a completely different face.

But what does all this have to do with “Baby Reindeer,” which is supposedly a series about stalking?

It has a lot to do with it because stalking is a narrative device to introduce us to the darkest depths of the psyche of its protagonist, for whom the definition of stalking victim is certainly fitting but only gives us a part of his true nature and identity.

“Baby Reindeer” is a Netflix miniseries from 2024, created, written, and performed by Richard Gadd and based on his eponymous one-man show, inspired by real events experienced by Gadd himself.

Donny is a young bartender and aspiring comedian in his early thirties who finds himself involved in a stalking situation when he meets Martha (played by the talented Jessica Gunning). From that moment, Martha begins to send him an excessive number of messages and emails, convinced that she has a relationship with him. Martha’s invasive actions do not stop there: she begins to sexually harass him, awakening in Donny memories of a trauma suffered many years before.

It is precisely this trauma and its posthumous elaboration that offer us an interpretative key to the drama that Donny is experiencing, only partly attributable to his harasser. A journey into the abyss that generates discomfort mixed with a sort of compassion towards the protagonist and his vulnerabilities, which are the children of our time and a toxic culture regarding success and personal fulfillment.

The television series is an opportunity for legal reflection on stalking and the measures provided by the legislature to protect victims.

The term stalking (from the English “to stalk” meaning to lurk, follow, or harass) represents a form of aggression carried out by a stalker who intrudes repeatedly, unwantedly, and destructively into the private life of another individual, causing serious physical or psychological consequences to the latter.

With the term stalking, therefore, we refer to the conduct typical of someone who pursues another person in order to torment them and make their life impossible, through annoying and harassing behaviors that become continuous and end up constituting serious and systematic violations of personal freedom.

We are generally inclined to associate the stalking victim with the female figure, but the chronicles and sentences of the courts demonstrate the transversality of the phenomenon, which unfortunately also affects men, who are often less inclined to report and seek help in the name of a culture that considers them the “stronger sex,” capable of solving their problems autonomously.

At the European level, stalking is considered a crime and recognized as a form of gender-based violence. The European Union has adopted various measures and policies to combat stalking and protect victims. For example, Directive 2011/99/EU establishes minimum standards for the rights and protection of victims of crimes, including stalking.

Directive 2011/99/EU, based on the principle of mutual recognition, regulates the European protection order with the aim of ensuring that measures taken to protect a person from acts of criminal significance, which may harm or endanger their life, physical or mental integrity, dignity, personal freedom, or sexual integrity, are maintained even if that person moves to another Member State (art. 1). In particular, the European protection order can be issued if the person benefiting from the protection decides to reside or stay in another Member State (art. 6).

It is recalled that mutual recognition of protective measures in civil matters is instead ensured by Regulation No. 606/2013 of June 12, 2013. The measure ensures that measures imposing on a person determining the risk, in order to protect another person, the prohibition of any contact or the prohibition of approaching the protected person within a defined perimeter are respected in all Member States.

In various European countries, there are specific laws that punish stalking and offer protection measures to victims. These laws may vary, but often include no-contact orders, restraining orders, and treatment programs for perpetrators.

Europe has also promoted awareness and training campaigns to increase awareness of stalking and encourage victims to report. Additionally, support services and emergency hotlines have been established to assist victims.

Specific anti-stalking legislation has been enacted in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Returning to the Baby Reindeer series, the protagonist manages to report his harasser and have her convicted. It is the end of a nightmare but – it is useful to remember – Baby Reindeer is not strictly a series about stalking, and Donny, after finally freeing himself from his tormentor, is not yet safe.

PHOTO: The Netflix series “Baby Reindeer”

Clarifying the meaning of terms is a good starting point to introduce a current and meaningful topic such as gender identity and sexual orientation.

If we attempt to explain it through the analysis of one of the most successful Netflix series of recent years, understanding is certainly facilitated.

And the law?

The law can help us frame the phenomenon, but it’s not necessarily the best tool to understand it. It depends on the worldview and understanding of the human gender prevailing in a specific country and historical period, which shapes the thoughts and actions of legislators and interpreters.

It’s important to keep this truth in mind because while the law is a wonderful invention, it unfortunately reflects the influence of the “dominant culture,” which may not always foresee and promote the recognition and protection of the multiple forms of human gender.

Let’s begin with the semantic aspect.

If the term “gender” identifies the condition of being male or female assigned to an individual at birth based on their external genitalia, “gender identity” expresses a person’s sense of belonging to a gender, which can be female, male, or non-binary. It represents the perception that each individual has of themselves as male or female or sometimes as belonging to categories other than male or female.

Gender dysphoria refers to the emotional and cognitive discomfort related to the gender assigned to us and consists of a condition of misalignment between sex (or gender assigned at birth) and gender identity: it concerns all individuals who feel they belong to a gender different from the one assigned to them at birth or who do not feel they fully belong to either the female or male gender, or whose gender identity is fluid, oscillating between male and female over time.

Gender identity is a “spectrum” that connects the two extremes of male and female gender, within which we find Cisgender (indicating individuals who identify with the gender corresponding to their biological sex), Transgender (indicating a person who does not conform to expectations, roles, and attitudes associated with the gender assigned at birth), Transsexual (a transgender person who – not identifying with their biological sex – has begun a treatment process to modify their body towards the preferred gender), Non-binary (a term adopted by those who do not recognize the binary construction of gender, meaning the idea that there are only female and male genders; this definition includes both genderqueer people, who identify with a personal mix of the two genders, and genderfluid people, whose gender identity is fluid and oscillates between male and female), Agender (people who refuse to identify with a gender). From a biological perspective, there is also the condition of intersex, which concerns those individuals whose sex chromosomes, hormones, or genital organs are not exclusively male or female.

While gender identity concerns self-perception, sexual orientation relates to how one relates to others and indicates physical or romantic attraction to a person. Sexual orientation does not coincide with gender: they are two different things that can intersect in many ways.

There are many types of sexual orientation, and all (it needs to be emphasized, even shouted if necessary) deserve protection.

There are Heterosexuals (those who identify with a gender and are exclusively attracted to people of the opposite gender), Homosexuals (attracted to people of their same gender; this definition includes lesbian women and gay men), Bisexuals (who are attracted to both male and female genders), Pansexuals (who feel attraction regardless of the other person’s gender, thus including those with a fluid or non-binary identity), Asexuals (who do not feel sexual attraction towards people of either gender but are capable of experiencing deep emotions and establishing important relationships).

Sexual orientation is not a static condition but a fluid one that can change – more or less – over the years, even in adulthood. Many psychological and scientific studies show that having a fluid sexual orientation is not uncommon. Sexual fluidity is manifested in both males and females because the ability to change one’s sexual tendencies is innate in humans.

This diverse framework of one of the most intimate and discriminated spheres gives us a beautiful picture of the heterogeneity of the human gender, its inclinations, and its infinite ways of conceiving and practicing sexual pleasure.

Libido. Every discussion about sexuality, gender identity, sexual orientation should actually begin with this term. Because it’s around the theme of sexual pleasure that a curtain of taboos and prejudices often falls, preventing us from grasping its true essence: the inherently subjective nature of pleasure as an expression of the diversity of those who practice it.

Sexual education is rarely included in school curricula, and when it is taught, it often reduces to a generic warning about the risks of unprotected sex and the consequences of unwanted pregnancies.

The topic of libido is left to private experience, yet it would be an extraordinary form of education about diversity. Pleasure is subjective and, when sought and practiced lawfully, is something inherently normal. Explaining its matrix and implications could help combat stereotypes and prejudices, promoting greater understanding and tolerance in society.

If we want to find a parallel with the cinematic and television world (always useful considering the didactic value of cinema and television), we cannot fail to mention the British series “Sex Education,” which aired on Netflix for 4 seasons from 2019 to 2023.

It is a true television gem that has forever changed the way of narrating the sexuality of teenagers, giving us a finally realistic and inclusive representation of the different gender identities and sexual experiences of young people dealing with the anatomical and emotional aspects related to sex. Characters like Otis, Eric, Ola, and Lily offer a glimpse into the complexity of gender identity and the challenges that LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) people face in their daily lives.

The series reminds us of the importance of inclusive sexual education that takes into account all diversities. It is an anthem to freedom that uses the topic of sex as a means to talk about identity, friendship, respect, vulnerability, resilience, self-esteem. It should be screened in schools.

But let’s not digress and come to the law. Why talk about law after introducing topics such as gender identity, orientation, and sexual education?

Because the law is (and must be) a promoter of a culture opposed to any form of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. It must contribute to creating conditions where lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people can fully enjoy their rights.

For years, the UN and the Council of Europe have been urging member states to adopt measures to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.

In resolution 1728 (2010), adopted on April 29, 2010, concerning discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe invites States “to ensure, in legislation and practice, the rights [of transgender people] (…) to obtain official documents reflecting the chosen gender identity, without the prior requirement of undergoing sterilization or other medical procedures such as sex conversion surgery or hormone therapy.”

At this point, we need to ask a question. Do these enunciations of principles and values that translate into virtuous and proactive legislative recommendations find fertile ground in the legislative production of individual states?

The answer is not always, not in all states, especially in those where the rights of individuals and families have a religious matrix that reflects on the recognition and protection of fundamental human rights.

The answer is not always, not in all states, especially in those where the law concerning individuals and families has a religious foundation that influences the recognition and protection of fundamental human rights.

An example of this is Iraq. In April 2024, the Iraqi Parliament passed a law criminalizing homosexual relationships and gender transitions, with penalties of up to 15 years in prison. The law also prohibits “any organization that promotes homosexuality in Iraq,” with a seven-year prison sentence for “promoting” homosexual relationships. It prohibits “the change of biological sex based on individual desires or inclinations” and imposes a penalty of one to three years in prison for anyone or any doctor involved in this transition.

At the European level, there is a cultural and legal evolution towards recognizing the right to gender identity as a fundamental component of personal identity.

In June 2018, the European Court of Justice recognized the validity of same-sex marriage in all member countries “under the free movement of persons” (this ruling does not concern the approval of same-sex marriage in individual member states but the validity that such an institution, if celebrated in the European Union, must be recognized in a state without such regulation).

In more and more European countries, such as Germany, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Norway, and Switzerland, officially changing gender will only require a simple self-declaration, and surgical interventions will no longer be necessary. In Italy, gender change has been recognized since 1982, but “surgical correction” of gender is required. However, thanks to two rulings of the Court of Cassation and one of the Constitutional Court, today it is sufficient to accompany the request for a gender change with the opinion of an expert who evaluates the psychological conditions and motivation behind such requests.

Despite these significant steps forward for the full recognition of LGBT rights, there are unfortunately still worrying regressions resulting from a conservative and reactionary politics.

In Italy, a bill (DDL Zan) that would have established protections against discrimination for LGBT people was recently rejected.

In the world, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people continue to be victims of attacks and hate crimes.

There is still much to be done.

The hope is that the law will take on an increasingly proactive role in achieving and enforcing virtuous objectives and in making rights and freedoms a consolidated reality in a given social and cultural context.

1st photo: Netflix series “Sex Education”

On the world stage, Saudi Arabia today presents itself as an increasingly liberal power.

Since 2016, when it first announced plans to diversify its economy, the kingdom has invested billions to appear more progressive by revamping its image in the eyes of foreigners.

Women can drive, attend sporting events and do jobs that were previously prohibited.Huge sums have been invested in futuristic architectural projects such as The Line, a huge desert city, to attract tourists from all over the world.

Saudi Arabia actually tries to present itself on the world stage as an increasingly moderate power, yet Saudi citizens tell a different story.

In fact, a fake liberal mask hides a reality of repression, violence and injustice.

In Saudi Arabia, a tweet that the authorities don’t like is enough to spend decades in prison. As in the case of Salma el-Shehab, mother of two, women’s rights activist and doctoral student at the University of Leeds, in the United Kingdom.

In 2021, Salma returns to Saudi Arabia for a holiday, she is arrested and held in solitary confinement for 285 days before being tried. An anti-terrorism court sentenced her to 34 years in prison. After an appeal last January, the computer crime charges were cancelled, while the others under the anti-terrorism law remained standing. The sentence is very heavy: 27 years of imprisonment, followed by the same number of years of travel ban. For the Saudi authorities, women who want to work, move, live freely, as well as independent journalists, critical voices or those who express their opinions on Twitter “are all potential terrorists and deserve exemplary punishments“.

The leaked draft of Saudi Arabia’s first written penal code falls far short of universal human rights standards and highlights the hypocrisy behind Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s promises to credit his government as progressive and inclusive.

This draft violates international laws and codifies already existing repressive practices. In addition, it criminalizes the rights to freedom of expression, thought and religion, criminalizes “illegitimate” consensual sexual relations, homosexuality and abortion, and fails to protect women and girls from gender-based violence. Furthermore, it also codifies the use of the death penalty among the main punishments and allows the use of corporal punishment such as flogging.

These provisions would allow the persecution and torture of people belonging to the LGBTQIA+ community (L= lesbian; G= gay; B=bisexual; T= transgender and transsexual; Q= queer; I= intersexual, A=asexual; += indicates the possibility to incorporate other gender identities and/or sexual orientations, to make the list increasingly inclusive)

The “draft of the penal code” codifies the death penalty as the main punishment for a series of crimes, ranging from murder to rape to non-violent crimes such as apostasy and blasphemy, and also allows corporal punishment such as the amputation of the hands. Despite promises made by Prince Bin Salman to limit the use of the death penalty to the most serious sharia crimes, there has been a frightening increase in executions under his rule, including one of the largest mass executions with 81 people in March 2022. This code also provides that minors as young as seven years old can be sentenced to death.

“It is vital that the United Nations Human Rights Council, establishes a mechanism to monitor the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia, in order to prevent the Saudi authorities from continuing to hide the grave reality of their repression, by promoting abroad a glamorous and progressive of their country.